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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order striking Plaintiffs expert witness and from orders 
granting summary judgment in a civil case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking Dr. John Goldenring as an 
expert witness? "The trial court has discretion to determine the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and to determine if the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular 
matter." Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744. 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants on Plaintiffs causes of action and claim for punitive damages? "Tor 
summary judgment to be appropriate there must be no genuine issue of material fact. The 
moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
part}7. We grant no deference to the district court's conclusions of law and review them 
for correctness." Bowman v. Kalm. 2008 UT 9. ^ 6, 179 P.3d 754. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b). if scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
l 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying 
the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based on 
sufficient facts or data, and (Hi) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of 
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community7. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603(l)(a) (2008): 
A judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplar}7 or 
punitive damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a medical malpractice case arising from one-year old Derek Nguyen's 
("Derek") November 24-26. 2001 hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center 
O'PCMC) following a motor vehicle accident in which Derek sustained life-threatening 
injuries. (R. at 80-92.) On November 26. 2001. a pediatric transport ventilator that was 
being used on Derek suddenh lost power. (R. at 5-6.). Despite attempts to resuscitate 
Derek, he died approximatel} 45 minutes later. (R. at 806. 816.) 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics. 
University of Utah and State of Utah (collecth eh the "Universit} Defendants") arise 
from the alleged acts and omissions of Dr. Madolin Witte. the physician responsible for 
managing Derek's treatment and care in the pediatric intensive care unit ("PICU") at 
PCMC. (R. at 65, 793.) Dr. Witte is an employee of the University of Utah School of 
Medicine who was acting within the course and scope of her employment in providing 
treatment and care to Derek. (R. at 65, 785.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
On January 27, 2003. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the University 
Defendants, PCMC and the manufacturer of the pediatric transport ventilator, Puhnonetic 
Systems, Inc. ('Tulmonetic"). (R. at 1-12.) Plaintiffs claims against Puhnonetic were 
dismissed with prejudice after those two parties reached a settlement. (R. at 203-209.) 
Plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence, failure to obtain informed 
consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the University Defendants 
and PCMC. Plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. (R. at 88-91.) PCMC 
filed motions for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and claim for punitive damages. (R. at 525-
616, 617-669.) The University Defendants joined both motions. (R. at 689-692, 694-
735.) At a July 23, 2008 hearing, the trial court granted the motions. (R. at 3400 at pp. 
72-74, 84-85.) The Court's rulings are reflected in two orders entered on August 14, 
2008. (R. at 3381-3383, 3387-3388.) 
The University7 Defendants filed a motion strike Dr. John Goldenring as an expert 
witness. (R. at 738-871.) PCMC joined that motion. (R. at 959-1061.) Following a 
hearing, the trial court granted the motion in an eight-page Ruling dated July 29. 2008. 
(R. at 2589-2596.) The trial court's Ruling is reflected in an order entered on August 15. 
2008. (R. at 3392-3394.) 
After the trial court struck Dr. Goldenring. PCMC filed a motion for summary 
judgment with respect to Plaintiffs two remaining causes of action for negligence and 
failure to obtain informed consent. (R. at 2746-2906.) The University Defendants joined 
the motion. (R. at 2907-2909.) The trial court granted the motion at an August 1. 2008 
hearing. (R. at 3531 at pp. 13-14—Tr. of 8/1/08 Hearing.) The trial court's ruling is 
reflected in an order that was entered on August 15. 2008. (R. at 3396-3398.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DEREK'S MEDICAL CONDITIONAND HISHEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 
1. On November 24. 2001. Derek was transported to PCMC via helicopter and 
admitted to the PICU with multiple life-threatening injuries, including a degloving scalp 
laceration, facial lacerations, fractured skull, a brain injur}7, contusions to both lungs and 
lacerations to intra-abdominal organs. (R. at 807-807. 3400 at p. 4.) 
2. Dr. Madolin Witte was Derek's attending physician at PCMC. Dr. Witte is 
an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, where she has held faculty 
appointments in the Division of Pediatric Critical Care and Division of Pediatric 
Pulmonary Medicine for the past 20 years. Dr. Witte "s clinical practice of medicine is 
limited to providing inpatient critical care and pulmonary care to pediatric patients at 
PCMC. (R. at 785. 793.) 
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3. After graduating from medical school, Dr. Witte completed residency 
training in pediatrics, followed by fellowship training in pediatric pulmonary medicine 
and pediatric critical care medicine. Dr. Witte is board certified in pediatrics. She also 
holds subspecialty board certifications in both pediatric critical care medicine and 
pediatric pulmonology. (R. at 786, 788.) 
4. During Derek's three-day hospitalization, Dr. Witte obtained consultations 
from other physicians about various aspects of Derek's medical condition. The consulted 
physicians were from trauma surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery, ophthalmology, 
cardiology and plastic surgery. Dr. Witte also received input about Derek's condition 
from a PICU fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU nurses. (R. at 793, 
3400 at p. 6.) 
5. While Dr. Witte obtained input from many other health care providers, she 
retained ultimate responsibility for making decisions about Derek's treatment and care. 
(R. at 793.) 
6. Derek's two most pressing medical problems were his brain injur}7 and 
injury to his lungs. The brain injury had caused swelling and elevated intracranial 
pressures (;*ICPs")? which were being monitored. Elevated ICPs can cause inadequate 
blood supply to the brain, resulting in permanent neurologic injur}7 or death. The 
adequacy of blood perfusion to Derek's brain was also being monitored and measured in 
units of cerebral perfusion pressure ("CPPs"). (R. at 791, 794. 806, 845.) 
7. Despite aggressive treatment of Derek's brain injur}7, his elevated ICPs and 
low CPPs worsened. By November 26. Derek's ICPs were in the mid to high twenties. 
A normal ICP is under fifteen. Derek's CPPs were in the forties. Even a brain injured 
patient should have a CPP of sixty. Derek's low CPPs caused Dr. Witte to be concerned 
about brain injur}' from inadequate perfusion of Derek's brain. In Dr. Witte's clinical 
judgment. Derek's ICPs and CPPs were not conducive to a good neurologic outcome. 
(R. at 795, 808-809.) 
8. Dr. Witte's assessment of the likely effect of Derek's elevated ICPs and 
low CPPs on his neurologic function were based on Dr. Witte's experience as a pediatric 
critical care physician and her knowledge of the medical literature in that area. (R. at 
795-796.) 
9. Derek's respirator}7 failure required him to be intubated and placed on a 
ventilator. Oxygen saturation levels in Derek's tissues were being measured. Like his 
head injury. Derek's respirator}' condition and oxygen saturation levels worsened during 
his hospitalization. By November 26. Derek's bedside ventilator had to be set at a very 
high pressure to adequately inflate his lungs. Specifically, a pressure of 60 was required 
to inflate Derek's lungs. A normal inflation pressure would be in the teens. Despite this 
extreme pressure setting. Derek's oxygen saturation levels were not adequate. (R. at 804. 
806-807.809.) 
10. Complicating matters for Dr. Witte was a concern that treatment of Derek's 
brain injur} was compounding his lung injur} and vise versa. Specificalh. Dr. Witte was 
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concerned that measures being taken to increase Derek's CPP could be causing or 
contributing to poor heart function. In fact, by November 26, Dr. Witte was concerned 
that Derek could go into cardiopulmonary arrest within hours. Dr. Witte was also 
concerned that Derek's poor heart function and the treatment of his lung injuries with 
high pressure ventilation may be causing elevated ICPs. (R. at 791, 795. 804, 806, 809.) 
DECISION TO OBTAIN A BRAIN CT SCAN 
11. Dr. Witte's assessment of Derek's worsening cardiopulmonary and brain 
conditions led her to question whether a different course of treatment should be pursued. 
In particular, Dr. Witte questioned whether an intracranial bleed or a blood clot in 
Derek's brain was causing his worsening ICPs and CPPs. If so, surgery could be 
performed to treat the bleeding or clotting. If, however, bleeding or clotting was not 
present and the swelling of Derek's brain was not severe, Dr. Witte planned to shift gears 
and focus on maximizing treatment of Derek's lung and heart injuries by placing him on 
a different type of ventilator that can generate very high pressures. (R. at 795-796. 807.) 
12. By the afternoon of November 26. Dr. Witte believed that it was "very 
critical" to obtain a brain CT scan to assess possible causes for Derek's \* orsening ICPs 
and CPPs and to evaluate whether a different type of ventilator should be used. In Dr. 
Witte "s professional judgment, a CT scan was a prerequisite to am nev\ course of 
treatment. (R. at 791. 795. 807-809.) 
13. Derek had to be transported from the PICU for a CT scan. ^Tiiie Dr. Witte 
knevv that transporting Derek involved risk, she concluded that the risk of not doing a CT 
scan exceeded the risk of the transport. In fact, Dr. Witte believed there was a high 
likelihood that Derek would die if a CT scan was not performed in the afternoon of 
November 26, 2001. Dr. Witte's conclusion about the necessity of obtaining a CT scan 
was based on both the severity and instability of Derek's condition. (R. at 796, 802-804.) 
USE OFPULMONETIC \^ENTILA TOR DURING TRANSPORT 
14. To transport Derek to the CT scanner, it was necessary to use a portable 
ventilator. After receiving input from other health care providers, including the PICU 
fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU nurses, Dr. Witte decided to use 
a ventilator manufactured by Pulmonetic because it was the only available transport 
ventilator that could provide the level and mode of ventilation support Derek required. 
(R. at 789, 791, 793-794, 799, 812.) 
15. The Pulmonetic ventilator is approved by the FDA for use on pediatric 
patients in intensive care units and for use in transporting pediatric patients. Further, the 
ventilator is used at other pediatric hospitals to transport critically ill patients from the 
PICU to the CT scanner. (R. at 805, 1882-1883, 1898.) 
16. When asked what she would have done if the Pulmonetic ventilator had not 
been available. Dr. Witte testified: 
Well, it's hard to say not knowing what his course would 
have been, but I would have been reluctant to try to transport 
him on a different ventilator because in our experience it 
didn't support patients with this severity of lung disease very 
reliably, and so I think it was possible that had he continued 
to worsen our hand might have been forced and we would 
have tried to do that anyway. I think at that particular 
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moment in time had that ventilator not been available I would 
not have taken him for CT scan. 
(R. at 790). 
17. Before Derek was transported to the CT scanner, his father was advised that 
(1) Dr. Witte thought it was important to obtain a CT scan; (2) Derek would have to be 
transported for the CT scan; and (3) there was risk involved in transporting Derek out of 
the PICU. After being informed about the risks and benefits of the CT scan and 
transport, Derek's father responded by saying, "Do what you can to save my son/' (R. at 
1889, 1907.) 
18. Prior to being transported to the CT scanner, Derek was placed on the 
Pulmonetic ventilator in the PICU and monitored for approximately an hour. During that 
time, it was confirmed that the ventilator was duplicating the level of support provided by 
Derek's bedside ventilator. (R. at 790. 808, 813-814.) 
19. While Dr. Witte had no concerns about the Pulmonetic ventilator's 
performance, she acknowledges that transporting a patient outside of the PICU always 
presents a risk to the patient's ventilation status. Dr. Witte further acknowledges that all 
ventilators malfunction periodically for various reasons. For that reason, transports are 
always made with emergency equipment so that the patient can be manually ^ entilated if 
necessary. (R. at 796. 1255. 1890. 1892.) 
20. A number of people accompanied Derek during his transport to and from 
the CT scanner, including Derek's father. Dr. Witte. the PICU felloe. a respirator}* 
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therapist, a pediatric Life Flight nurse, a PICU nurse and a representative from 
Pulmonetic. (R. at 794, 797, 804, 820.) 
21. After the CT scan was completed, Derek was being transported back to the 
PICU when the Pulmonetic ventilator suddenly lost power. A respiratory therapist 
involved in the transport immediately began manually ventilating Derek with a bag, but 
Derek did not respond. Upon arrival at the PICU, Derek w7as placed on a high pressure 
bedside ventilator. Efforts to resuscitate Derek over a 45 minute time period were not 
successful. (R. at 797, 815-817, 821.) 
22. A subsequent investigation conducted by Pulmonetic concluded that the 
ventilator most likely lost power as a result of a screw making contact with the 
ventilator's motherboard and causing it to short circuit. The investigation did not reveal 
any misuse of the ventilator, and the lead investigator testified that the health care 
providers could not have known about the screw problem. (R. at 824-827.) 
23. Dr. Witte testified that if she had the decision to make all over again, she 
would still order the use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 793.) 
PCMCSEVALUATION OF VENTILATORS FOR PURCHASE 
24. In July 2001. PCMC began considering the purchase of a new pediatric 
transport ventilator. The anticipated initial use of the new ventilator was on patients 
being transported on Life Flight, but it was also anticipated that the new ventilator would 
eventually replace transport ventilators being used in the hospital. (R. at 1881. 2004-
2005. 32^2-3243.) 
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25. PCMC has an organized process for gathering and reviewing information 
about equipment to assist it in making a purchasing decision. This process is called 
Clinical Technology Management ("CTM process"). The CTM process is recommended 
but is not mandator}7. (R. at 1982, 2016.) 
26. The stated purpose of the CTM process is to ;*[c]reate an integrated system 
for management of clinical equipment within and between IHC facilities which optimally 
coordinates and focuses the diverse elements of the 'equipment life cycle.5 These 
elements include technology Planning. Assessment, Acquisition, Utilization, 
Maintenance and Disposition." (R. at 3232.) 
27. A committee was formed to participate in a CTM process for evaluating 
and selecting a new transport ventilator. Members of the committee included Dr. Witte, 
nurses, respiratory therapists, clinical engineering personnel and finance department 
personnel. The committee established both clinical and nonclinical criteria for evaluating 
the ventilators. The committee eventually selected two ventilators, the Pulmonetic 
ventilator and the Cross Vent ventilator, for clinical evaluations. (R. at 787, 1881, 1983-
1986.3241-3243.3249-3254.) 
28. In preparation for the clinical evaluations, the committee discussed the need 
to engage PCMC's risk management department in a discussion regarding the need for 
parental approval for participation in the clinical evaluations, but the CTM committee 
notes do not reflect that parental approval was ultimate!}' required. Dr. Witte testified 
that she does not believe informed consent was required for purposes of conducting the 
clinical evaluations. The chairperson of the CTM committee, Tammy Bleak. R.N., 
similarly testified that she did not intend to have parents of patients Vsho participated in 
the clinical evaluations sign a consent form. (R. at 789. 1910. 3174.) 
29. While Dr. Witte vs as not im olved in any CTM committee discussions about 
the type of patient that would be selected to participate in the clinical evaluations, her 
understanding \\ as that moderately ill patients vs ould be selected because they most 
closel} represent the population of patients transported on Life Flight. The record does 
not reflect any decision being made by the CTM committee to preclude use of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator on other types of patients, including critically ill or unstable 
patients. (R. at 800-801. 2639. 3171-3174.) 
30. Dr. Witte is unaw are of any hospital policy that v\ ould has e prohibited her 
from using the Pulmonetic \ entilator on Derek. Further, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the ventilator w as to be used onl\ for purposes of conducting the CTM 
clinical evaluations. (R. at 793. 1263. 1272.) 
31. Dr. Witte*s decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator on Derek was outside 
the scope of the CTM process. Dr. Witte made it clear to those invoh ed in transporting 
Derek that the}7 vv ere not using the ventilator as part of the CTM process. For that reason, 
no CTM evaluation forms \*ere used. (R. at 1885.) 
32. Dr. Witte ^ ievs ed the ^ entilator as an FDA apprcrs ed medical de^ ice that 
^ ould help her obtain information that was necessan to make treatment decisions for 
Derek. Dr. Witte testified that the decision to use the ventilator was not based on 
anything other than what she believed to be in Derek's best interest. (R. at 1885, 1895.) 
33. The chairperson of the CTM committee. Tammy Bleak. R.N., denied 
having any quality assurance responsibility for new equipment. Nurse Bleak testified 
that when new equipment comes to PCMC from the manufacturer, it is considered to be 
"worthy to be used" on patients after PCMCs clinical engineering department performs a 
basic electrical safety inspection. An electrical safety inspection was completed on the 
Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1242, 1914.) 
34. The clinical engineer who performed the electrical safety inspection of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator, Ramsey Worman, did not express any disagreement with the 
decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator on patients. Mr. Worman did, however, 
confirm that the clinical engineering department w7as not capable of testing the 
operational functioning of the Pulmonetic ventilator and that the department must rely on 
manufacturers to ensure that new equipment operates correctly. (R. at 1915-1916.) 
35. Another member of the CTM committee who is a respirator}7 care manager 
confirmed that specification testing is not performed and that it is "assumed that the 
manufacturer is providing us with a safe and sound piece of equipment/* (R. at 2026.) 
DR. JOHN GOLDENRING'S EDUCA TION, TRAINING & EXPERIENCE 
36. Plaintiffs sole expert is Dr. John Goldenring. After graduating from 
medical school, Dr. Goldenring completed residency training in pediatrics followed by a 
fellowship in adolescent medicine. Adolescent medicine physicians treat patients ranging 
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in age from 9 to 25 years. Dr. Goldenring has never had residency or fellowship training 
in pediatric critical care medicine or pediatric pulmonology. and he is not board certified 
in either of those subspecialties. (R. at 856. 859.) 
37. Dr. Goldenring has no active privileges to admit patients to any hospital or 
to practice medicine in any hospital. The last time Dr. Goldenring had active hospital 
privileges was sometime between 2001 and 2003. and the last time he used hospital 
privileges was in 1995. (R. at 860.) 
•38. While Dr. Goldenring claims to have worked in hospitals similar to PCMC 
such as Los Angeles Children's Hospital, San Diego Children's Hospital and Galveston 
Children's Hospital, the record does not establish that Dr. Goldenring worked in a PICU 
at any of those hospitals. (R. at 1927-1928.) 
39. From 1983 to 1994. Dr. Goldenring practiced general pediatrics. The 
record reflects that his only experience in a PICU was between 1987 and 1991. During 
that period of time. Dr. Goldenring would round on his general pediatric patients if they 
were hospitalized, but he always got lots of help from specialists, including critical care 
physicians. Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that "It's not appropriate for a general 
pediatrician to take on a really bad case, even in the old days, without getting lots of 
help." Dr. Goldenring also agrees that the current standard requires patients such as 
Derek to be managed by critical care physicians. (R. at 845, 857. 1927. 1931-1932.) 
40. Since 1994. Dr. Goldenring has primarily worked as an administrator and 
consultant for health maintenance organizations ("HMO") and individual practice 
14 
associations ("IP A"), where his work is focused on maintaining contracts with health care 
providers and ensuring that those providers follow HMO and IPA rules. (R. at 1928-
1930, 1933,2151.) 
41. Dr. Goldenring has never worked as a hospital administrator. Further, he 
has never been involved as a member of a hospital committee that evaluated new 
equipment for purchase. Moreover, Dr. Goldenring has no experience writing protocols 
for evaluations of new7 equipment. Finally, the record does not reflect that Dr. 
Goldenring reviewed any documents created by the CTM committee in this case. (R. at 
1928-1930,2151.) 
42. The record does not indicate that Dr. Goldenring has any experience 
reviewing the quality of care provided by pediatric critical care physicians or in 
reviewing the quality of care provided by any other type of health care provider in a 
PICU setting. (R. at 1314-1315.) 
43. While Dr. Goldenring claims to have been "involved in informed consent 
issues of all kinds for many years," the record does not reflect that he has any experience 
in obtaining informed consent for the transport of PICU patients. (R. at 1338.) 
OPINIONS REGARDING NECESSITY OF CT SCAN 
44. In his deposition, Dr. Goldenring expressed a number of opinions regarding 
the standard of care for Dr. Witte. Dr. Goldenring*s first criticism is that a CT scan was 
not critical at the time it was ordered by Dr. Witte. (R. at 85 L 854.) 
45. The basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinion is his interpretation of Dr. Witte's 
response to a hypothetical question of what she would have done if the Pulmonetic 
ventilator had not been available. (R. at 851. 854.) 
46. Dr. Goldenring admits that he is not an expert in ICPs. Dr. Goldenring 
formed his opinions about the treatment and care provided to Derek without reviewing 
what his ICPs were over the course of his hospitalization. (R. at 843-844. 846-847. 853.) 
47. When asked in his deposition what a normal ICP would be for Derek. Dr. 
Goldenring could not provide an answer. When pressed on the issue of ICPs. Dr. 
Goldenring responded. "What I'm telling you is that that is an [critical care]-
anesthesiologist and neurosurgical issue for me. That's not my major area of expertise 
and I w ouldn't tell you that it was." (R. at 845.) 
48. Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that CPPs are very important, but again 
admits that he is not an expert in that area. When asked vshat a target CPP would be for 
Derek. Dr. Goldenring could not provide an answer. Dr. Goldenring further testified that 
critical care physicians and neurosurgeons manage CPPs because "they are the ones that 
actually know that stuff, much better than I have ever forgotten." (R. at 847.) 
OPINIONS REGARDING CONSULTA HON WITH OTHER PRO VIDERS 
49. Dr. Goldenring opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by 
failing to consult with Derek's multidisciplinan team of providers before making the 
decision to transport him for a CT scan. In particular. Dr. Goldenring believes a 
neurosurgeon should ha^e been consulted. (R. at 854-855. 1346-1349. 1363.) 
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50. One basis for Dr. Goldenring*s opinion is his prior PICU experience. 
Specifically, Dr. Goldenring testified. "Thaf s what we do in the ICU. We stand next to 
the patient and look at the chart together and w e go okay and we try to come to a 
consensus on what to do next. That's the team approach. I'm assuming they used that 
approach/' (R. at 854. 1363.) 
51. Another basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinion is guidelines promulgated by 
the American Association for Respiratory Care (""AARC") for transporting ventilated 
patients. In particular. Dr. Goldenring relies on the following guideline: "The necessity 
and safety for transport should be assessed by the multidisciplinary team of health care 
providers, e.g. respirator}7 therapist, physician nurse." (R. at 1346, 3143.) 
52. When asked about the authoritativeness of the AARC guidelines. Dr. 
Goldenring testified. "There's a lot of things that go into the standard of care, and I rarely 
will say that a guideline on its own absolutely detennines everything because there's also 
case-by-case issues, but they're very relevant. I think." (R. at 1342.) 
OPINIONS REGARDING METHOD OF VENTILATION 
53. In Dr. Goldenring's opinion. Dr. Witte should have used a different means 
of ~\ entilation if it became necessan to transport Derek for a CT scan. In particular. Dr. 
Goldenring believes it w ould have been reasonable and safe to hand bag Derek during the 
transport. (R. at 838. 850-851.1352.) 
54. The basis for Dr. Goldenring*s opinion is his prior PICU experience. Dr. 
Goldenring testified that hand bagging was ""the old wa\ of doing things." He claims to 
r 
have consulted with a pulmonologist to confirm that hand bagging is still used to 
transport PICU patients. Dr. Goldenring also relies on AARC guidelines for transporting 
ventilated patients in support of his opinion. (R. at 850-851, 861, 1352.) 
55. Goldenring admits that he is not a ventilator expert and that he has never 
used the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Goldenring does, however, agree that not all 
ventilators would have met Derek's requirements. Dr. Goldenring defers to the 
respiratory therapists at PCMC as to whether any available ventilator besides the 
Pulmonetic ventilator could have been used. (R. at 850-852.) 
OPINIONS REGARDING "HOSPITAL RULES" 
56. In Dr. Goldenring's opinion, Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by 
failing to comply with "hospital rules" allegedly established by the CTM committee. Dr. 
Goldenring specifically opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by using the 
Pulmonetic ventilator on a critically ill patient. (R. at 854-855, 862, 864.) 
57. When asked to cite to a PCMC policy limiting use of the Pulmonetic 
ventilator to moderately ill patients, Dr. Goldenring was unable to do so. Instead. Dr. 
Goldenring relies on deposition testimony from Dr. Witte regarding the type of patient 
that was to be selected to participate in the CTM clinical evaluations. (R. at 864-865.) 
OPINIONS REGARDING INFORMED CONSENT 
58. Dr. Goldenring acknowledges that risks of transport were discussed with 
Derek's father but questions whether a language barrier prevented Derek's father from 
full}' understanding the information that was shared with him. Dr. Goldenring 
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acknowledges that he saw no discussion in the record as to how good Derek's father 
understood English. (R. at 855, 1322.) 
59. Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by 
failing to advise Derek's father of the risks of using an "untested" ventilator that was 
being evaluated by the CTM committee. Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte did 
not fully advise Derek's father of the risks of a ventilator malfunction. (R. at 1291, 1317-
1318,1322-1323.) 
60. A basis for Dr. Goldenring's opinions regarding informed consent is his 
interpretation of a PCMC publication titled, "Let's Talk About. . . patient and family 
rights." This one-page handout advises patients' parents that they have a right to be 
"informed about your child's current diagnosis, treatment and any known outcome." The 
handout further advises parents that they have the right to participate in their child's plan 
of care and "in collaboration with your physician, to make decisions to accept or refuse 
medical care as permitted by law, and to be informed of the medical consequences of 
such refusals." (R. at 855, 1317-1318, 1323,3146.) 
61. A critical care physician retained by the University as an expert witness. 
Dr. Stephen Schexnayder. testified in his deposition that the standard of care did not 
require Dr. Witte to obtain informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. 
Schexnayder specifically testified that the Pulmonetic ventilator is like any other piece of 
FDA approved medical equipment that is routineh" used to treat hospital patients without 
informed consent. (R. at 834.) 
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CA USA TION OPINIONS 
62. Dr. Goldenring opines that the Defendants' breaches of the standard of care 
caused Derek's death. (R. at 1318.) 
63. The basis for Dr. Goldenring* s opinion is his interpretation of Dr. Witte's 
deposition testimony about a conference with Derek's father following Derek's death. 
Dr. Witte's testimony follows: 
I think there was a clear temporal relationship between the 
ventilator malfunction and his deterioration, but I was trying 
to emphasize that it was the timing rather than the eventual 
outcome, that someone who had less severe injuries would 
not—would have tolerated a brief interruption of ventilation. 
So I shared with him that I couldn V say that the ventilator 
caused his death, and that I think without the trip to the CT 
scan there was a high likelihood that he would die, but the 
timing of his death was probably influenced by the ventilator 
malfunction. 
(R. at 1318-1319, 1892. Emphasis added.) 
64. Dr. Goldenring agrees that any opinion on what Derek's outcome would 
have been absent the ventilator malfunction would be speculative. When asked during 
his deposition if he could give an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certaint}" 
as to whether Derek would have survived absent the ventilator malfunction. Dr. 
Goldenring responded. "It's very difficult to say that. He certainly had a chance of 
survival. I'm not sure that I can give \ ou a number. I'm not sure that I have enough 
intensive care experience to do that." (R. at 856.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case arises from medical treatment decisions made by Dr. Witte, Dr. 
Goldenring is not qualified to criticize those decisions or to otherwise testify as an expert 
against Dr. Witte, Furthermore, Dr. Goldenring's opinions are not supported by the facts. 
Without the support of competent expert testimony, Plaintiffs causes of action for 
negligence and failure to obtain informed consent fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs 
informed consent claim also fails because the facts establish that informed consent was 
obtained and because the status of the CTM process is not a material medical risk that 
must be disclosed. The record does not support a cause of action for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress or a claim for punitive damages. Furthermore, the University 
Defendants are immune from liability for punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COURTS ARE CHARGED WITH A DUTY TO SCREEN 
OUT UNQUALIFIED AND UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert 
testimony. The rule assigns to trial courts i;a gatekeeper responsibility to screen out 
unreliable expert testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial courts are 
instructed to confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism." Utah R. 
Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (quotations omitted): Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 
UT 61. % 12. 987 P.2d 22. While rational skepticism is not defined by either Rule 702 or 
Utah case law, the dictionary definition of skepticism is ""(1) doubting attitude: an 
attitude marked by a tendency to doubt what others accept to be true.*" John R. Lund & 
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Keith A. Kelley, Skeptics at the Gate—The 2007 Revisions to Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Vol. 21, No. 4 Utah Bar Journal, 33, 36 (2008) (citation omitted). It has also 
been suggested that rational skepticism should include the query: "Why should I believe 
this?" Id (citing State v. Palumbo, 327 A.2d 613, 617 (Me. 1974)). 
Expert testimony must clear two hurdles before it may be admitted at trial. See 
Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, % 59, 61 P.3d 1068 (placing burden of establishing 
admissibility of expert testimony on part}7 seeking to present the testimony). First, under 
Rule 702(a), the proposed expert witness must be qualified to offer expert testimony 
through "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.'' Utah R. Evid. 702(a) . 
Second, under Rule 702(b), expert testimony must be (1) reliable; (2) based upon 
sufficient facts or data; and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah 
R. Evid. 702(b).1 
While the trial court focused on Rule 702(a) in striking Dr. Goldenring, Rule 
702(b) arguments were also presented to the court. (R. at 769, 971, 3400 at pp. 31-33, 
51-53.) This Court may affirm the trial court's order striking Dr. Goldenring on the basis 
of Rule 702(a), Rule 702(b) or any other grounds apparent from the record. See Wall v. 
Morris. 2008 UT App 333. f 3. 193 P.3d 1060. 
Rule 702 was amended in 2007. Previously. Rule 702(b) challenges went to the weight 
of testimony, not its admissibility. Under the amended rule, expert testimony must 
satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements before it ma}' be admitted at trial. See John R. Lund 
& Keith A. Kelley. Skeptics at the Gaze—The 2007 Revisions to Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Vol. 21. No.^ 4 Utah Bar Journal. 33. 36 (2008). 
II. DR. GOLDENRING IS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER EXPERT 
OPINIONS AGAINST DR. WITTE 
"By definition, an expert is one who possesses significant depth and breadth of 
knowledge on a given subject." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943. 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Trial courts are given discretion under Rule 702(a) to determine if a witness is 
qualified to testify as an expert. Id.; Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744. 746 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (affirming trial court's finding that expert was not qualified). The record showrs 
that Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an expert witness against Dr. Witte. 
A. Dr. Goldenring and Dr. Witte Have Different Medical 
Specialties 
A Rule 702(a) analysis must begin with a consideration of Dr. Goldenring's 
medical education, training and board certifications. The general rule regarding medical 
expert witnesses is that a practitioner from one specialty is not competent to testify as an 
expert against a practitioner from another specialty. See, e.g.. Burton v. Youngblood. Ill 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). While Dr. Goldenring and Dr. Witte are both pediatricians, 
their subspecialty certifications and clinical practices are very different. Dr. Goldenring's 
clinical experience was in general pediatrics and adolescent medicine. Dr. Witte is board 
certified in both pediatric critical care medicine and pediatric pulmonology. and her 
clinical practice is limited to those subspecialties in a critical care, inpatient hospital 
setting. She is not a general pediatrician. 
The Utah Supreme Court was presented with a similar distinction in expert 
qualifications in Burton. The defendant in that case was a general plastic surgeon who 
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performed upper eyelid surgery on the plaintiff. Id. at 247. The plaintiffs expert was an 
ocular plastic surgeon. Id. Even though both physicians were plastic surgeons, the more 
qualified ocular plastic surgeon was not allowed to testify as an expert against the general 
plastic surgeon because adequate foundation was not laid to establish that the same 
methods and standards of care in performing the surgery at issue applied to both 
specialists. Id. at 248-49. 
Plaintiff appears to recognize there are significant differences in education, 
training and practice areas between Dr. Witte and Dr. Goldenring and therefore argues 
that the Court should look beyond training and board certifications to determine if Dr. 
Goldenring is qualified to testify as an expert. An exception to the general rule applies if 
it can be established that the method of treatment, and hence the standard of care, is 
identical in different medical specialties such that a practitioner from one specialty would 
be knowledgeable about the standard of care in the other specialty. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 
P.2dl307. 1310 (Utah 1993). 
B. The General Rule Applies Without Exception in This Case 
In Patey v. LainharL 1999 UT 3L 977 P.2d 1193. the Utah Supreme Court applied 
the exception to the general rule in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a general 
dentist who treated the plaintiff to testify as an expert on the issue of whether an 
automobile accident caused the plaintiff to need root canal therapy. Id. at ^ 4-8. On 
appeal the defendant challenged the expert's competency to testify7 and argued that the 
proposed expert was a general dentist and not an endodontic specialist. Id. at \ 17. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing the general 
dentist to testify after concluding that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that the 
general dentist was qualified, both through formal training and actual practice in 
endodontics, to give expert opinions in that area of dentistry. Id. at % 18. In support of its 
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that one-fourth of the expert's dental education 
related to endodontics; that he had maintained ongoing educational study of endodontic 
procedures; that he was licensed to perform endodontic procedures; and that endodontics 
constituted a substantial portion of the expert's 36-year practice. Id. 
Similarly, in Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565, the issue was whether a 
neurosurgeon was qualified to testify as an expert against a physiatrist with respect to 
post-operative care provided to the patient following spinal surgery. Id. at %% 13-15. The 
court allowed the neurosurgeon to testify because he established that the standard of care 
for the post-surgical care at issue is the same regardless of whether it is provided by a 
physiatrist or a neurosurgeon. Id. In other cases wiiere a sufficient foundation was not 
laid for the exception to the general rule, courts have refused to allow the proposed expert 
to testify. See, e.g., Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, % 12, 166 P.3d 621 (holding 
anesthesiologist not qualified to testify as an expert on causation issues related to 
coronary artery disease). 
Unlike Patey\ the record in this case demonstrates that Dr. Goldenring does not 
have similar training as Dr. Witte or any experience practicing pediatric critical care 
medicine or pediatric pulmonary medicine. Unlike Boice, Dr. Goldenring has admitted 
that it is not appropriate for general pediatricians to manage critically ill patients in a 
PICU setting, so it cannot be established that the standard of care for managing such 
patients is the same regardless of whether the patients are managed by a general 
pediatrician or a pediatric critical care physician. Because the general rule applies in this 
case. Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an expert against Dr. Witte. A review 
of Dr. Goldenring's specific opinions confirms this conclusion. 
(i) Necessity of CT Scan and Method of Ventilation 
At its core, this case involves the following two medical decisions that were made 
by Dr. Witte: (1) to transport Derek for a CT scan; and (2) to use the Pulmonetic 
ventilator for the transport. While Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goldenring does not 
challenge Dr. Witte's decision making process, the record establishes that Dr. Goldenring 
has challenged both the necessity of obtaining a CT scan on the afternoon of November 
26 and the selection of the Pulmonetic ventilator as opposed to hand bagging: 
By his own admissions. Dr. Goldenring is not an expert in the medical issues that 
lead Dr. Witte to conclude that it was very critical to obtain a CT scan wiien it was 
performed. (R. at 843-848. 853.) A review of Dr. Goldenring "s deposition testimony 
about ICPs and CPPs demonstrates that he is out of his depth when it comes to the 
neurological issues that drove Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek for a CT scan. (R. 
at 843-847. 853.). 
Similarly. Dr. Goldenring admits that he is not an expert in ventilation and has no 
experience using the Pulmonetic ventilator at issue in this case. (R. at 851-852.) Further. 
26 
Dr. Goldenring defers to a respiratory therapist as to whether a different type of ventilator 
could have been used. (R. at 851-853.) Significantly, both Dr. Witte and the respiratory 
therapist involved in the transport testified that no other ventilator could have provided 
the level of support needed by Derek. (R. at 791, 799, 812.) While Dr. Goldenring 
speculated that hand bagging would have been a viable alternative, he readily admits that 
was the "old way of doing" things and that he had to consult with another physician to 
determine if that method is still used. (R. at 838, 850-851, 861, 1352.) 
While an otherwise qualified expert may not be precluded from testifying simply 
because he consulted with another expert, a physician who is not qualified to testify7 as an 
expert cannot become qualified by consulting with others. See Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 
P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming disqualification of expert who tried to 
become an expert on standard of care by reading and studying documents related to case). 
But see State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) (holding "once expert is 
qualified by the court, the witness may base his opinions on reports, writings or 
observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by others"')-
The record establishes that Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to offer expert opinions 
on either of the two primary medical decisions at issue in this case. In an effort to get 
around these deficiencies, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Goldenring is qualified to opine on the 
standard of care applicable to the entire team of health care providers involved in Derek's 
care even though Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify7 as to the standard of care for 
an}' single member of that team. Plaintiffs argument is not supported by any legal 
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authority, is illogical and fails to take into account the fact that the University Defendants 
are legally responsible for only one member of that team. Dr. Witte. 
(ii) Consultation 
Dr. Goldenring specifically opines that Dr. Witte breached a team standard of care 
by failing to consult with a neurosurgeon before transporting Derek. While a general 
pediatrician such as Dr. Goldenring would undoubtedly need to consult with a critical 
care physician or neurosurgeon about the need for a CT scan on a patient like Derek. Dr. 
Goldenring cannot competently say when a pediatric critical care physician must obtain 
consultation from another specialist without first establishing an understanding of the 
scope of a critical care physician's training and experience in managing PICU patients. 
As demonstrated by Dr. Goldenring's inability to assess the severity7 and 
significance of the brain injur}' that Dr. Witte was treating in this case. Dr. Goldenring 
has no knowledge of the limits of Dr. Witte" s ability to treat such injuries without 
consulting another specialist. Further, with respect to Derek's pulmonary issues. Dr. 
Witte is the expert since she is a pediatric pulmonary specialist. A neurosurgeon would 
go to Dr. Witte concerning pulmonary issues. 
(iii) Adherence to Alleged "Hospital Rules9' 
Dr. Goldenring also testifies that Dr. Witte breached team standards of care 
established through the CTM process. Because the record establishes that use of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator was outside the scope of the CTM process, facts regarding that 
process or alleged standards of care established by the CTM committee are irrelevant. 
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Even if the CTM process was relevant, Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to testify as an 
expert on standards of care allegedly created through the CTM process. 
While Dr. Goldenring claims to have 10 years of experience in administrative 
medicine, when probed about the details of that experience, Dr. Goldenring revealed the 
following: (1) he has never served as a hospital administrator; (2) he has never 
participated in a CTM-like process of evaluating new equipment for purchase; (3) he has 
never written protocols for a CTM-like process; and (4) his administrative experience 
primarily involves maintaining HMO and IPA contracts with health care providers and 
ensuring that those providers follow rules established by the HMOs and IP As that employ 
Dr. Goldenring. (R. at 1928-1930, 1933, 2151.) 
The record fails to establish that Dr. Goldenring has any experience that would 
qualify him as an expert on the issues of whether decisions made by the CTM committee 
have any application outside the CTM process or whether alleged rules established 
through the CTM process constitute standards of care for Dr. Witte. 
(iv) Informed Consent 
Dr. Goldenring also opines that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by failing 
to advise Derek's father about the risk of ventilator malfunction. (R. at 1322-1323.) Dr. 
Goldenring is admittedly not an expert in ventilators and therefore has no basis to 
authoritatively opine on the issue of what medical information about the ventilator, if 
any, should have been disclosed to Derek's father. Further, the record fails to establish 
that Dr. Goldenring has any experience obtaining informed consent for transports in a 
PICU setting. Finally, the record establishes that informed consent was obtained. The 
risk of transport was discussed, and Derek's father responded by stating, ;'Do what you 
can to save my son." (R. at 1889, 1907.) While Plaintiff may dispute the adequacy of the 
information provided, Dr. Goldenring simply isn't qualified to testify as an expert on that 
issue. Plaintiff additionally argues that Dr. Witte breached a standard of care by failing 
to advise Derek's father about the status of the CTM process. That argument is addressed 
below. 
DDL DR. GOLDENRING'S OPINIONS DO NOT SATISFY THE RULE 
702(B) REQUIREMENTS 
Rule 702(b) requires expert opinions to be (i) reliable; (ii) based on sufficient facts 
or data; and (iii) reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 702(b). Expert 
testimony "draws conclusions based on theories, tests and experience, and its utility turns 
in part on how7 closely the conclusion is connected to the underlying data—whether it is 
but a short step from data to conclusion or a long inferential leap. The closer the 
connection, the better the fit.*' Christopher B. Meller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick. Federal 
Evidence, Vol. 3. § 7:10 (3rd ed. 2007): see also McDowell v. Brown. 392 F.3d 1283. 
1299 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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 The University's critical care expert testified that Dr. Witte was not required to obtain 
informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Schexnayder specifically 
testified that the Pulmonetic ventilator is like any other piece of FDA approved medical 
equipment that is routinely used to treat hospital patients without informed consent. 
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When an expert's conclusion "simply does not follow from the incomplete data he 
examined, the court is free to determine that an impermissible analytical gap exists 
between the premises and conclusion." North v. Ford Motor Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1113. 
1119 (D. Utah 2007) (granting motion in limine to exclude expert testimony of 
psychologist who prepared damage reports). Rule 702 does not require a trial court i;to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert." Domingo v. T.K., MD.9 289 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Here, Dr. Goldenring's opinions do not follow7 from the facts contained in the 
record. Some of the alleged facts relied on by Dr. Goldenring are inaccurately stated by 
him. In addition, there are analytical gaps between the alleged facts and the conclusions 
Dr. Goldenring draws from them. 
A. Necessity of CT Scan 
Dr. Goldenring's criticism of the timing of Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek 
is based on an inaccurate interpretation of Dr. Witte's testimony about what she would 
have done if the Pulmonetic ventilator had not been available. In answering a 
hypothetical question, Dr. Witte did not state or imply that it would have been 
appropriate to defer the CT scan. (R. at 790.) While Dr. Witte acknowledges that she 
could not have transported Derek without the Pulmonetic ventilator. Dr. Witte clearly 
testified that she thought it w7as "very critical" that a CT scan be obtained in the afternoon 
of November 26. (R. at 795). Thus. Dr. Goldenring's opinion simply does not follow7 
from the evidence he relies on in support of that opinion. 
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B. Consultation and Method of Ventilation 
Dr. Goldenring relies on distant, prior experience rounding on his general pediatric 
patients in the PICU as a basis for his opinion that Dr. Witte should have consulted other 
health care providers before transporting Derek. As already discussed, Dr. Goldenring's 
past experience as a general pediatrician does not establish a reliable basis for opining on 
the standard of care for a pediatric critical care physician who is responsible for 
managing critically ill patients in a PICU setting. 
Dr. Goldenring also bases his opinion on an assumption that the providers at 
PCMC followed a team approach to providing treatment and care. (R. at 854, 1363.) 
Expert testimony may not be based on a "mere guess, speculation or conjecture/' 
Thurston v. Worker's Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, ^|20, 83 P.3d 391: see 
also Nelson v. Safeco Ins., Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278 (D. Utah 2005) (A "district 
court must exclude expert testimony that is no more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation"). 
Dr. Goldenring's assumption of how Dr. Witte and the other providers at PCMC 
interact with each other does not form a reliable basis for his expert opinions. 
Furthermore. Dr. Goldenring's assumption does not necessarily comport with the facts. 
Inanimate teams do not practice medicine or provide care; individual providers must do 
that within the scope of their respective licenses, training and experience. While Dr. 
Witte obtained input from other providers, she retained ultimate responsibility for making 
decisions about Derek's treatment and care. 
Finally, Dr. Goldenring's opinion that Dr. Witte failed to consult other members 
of the multidisciplinary team is simply inaccurate. Many other physicians were consulted 
during Derek's hospitalization, including neurosurgery. Moreover, Dr. Witte specifically 
obtained input from the PICU fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists and PICU 
nurses before making the decision to transport Derek for a CT scan. (R. at 793-794.) As 
previously noted, Dr. Goldenring is not qualified to criticize Dr. Witte for not obtaining 
specific consults about specific issues. While Dr. Witte did not consult with a 
neurosurgeon about the transport, the facts establish that the neurosurgery service had 
already ordered a CT scan. (R. at 795.) Thus, Dr. Goldenring's opinion on consultation 
is not reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
Dr. Goldenring's reliance on AARC guidelines in support of his opinions on 
consultation and the viability of hand bagging as an alternative method of ventilation is 
faulty for several reasons. First, the AARC is not an organization of physicians, and 
there is no authority supporting Dr. Goldenring's conclusion that guidelines promulgated 
by the AARC apply to physicians or that they set the standard of care for a pediatric 
critical care physician such as Dr. Witte. See http:// www.aarc.org/member_sen7ices 
("[T]he AARC is the only professional society7 for respirator}7 therapists in hospitals and 
with home care companies, managers of respiratory and cardiopulmonary sendees, and 
educators who provide respirator}7 care training/*). 
Second, even if the record established that AARC guidelines do set the standard of 
care for Dr. Witte. the cited guidelines do not support Dr. Goldenring's conclusions. The 
AARC guideline Dr. Goldenring relies on in support his consultation opinion reads "the 
necessity and safety for a transport should be assessed by the multidisciplinary team of 
health care providers, e.g. respirator}7 therapist, physician, nurse." (R. at 3143.) 
Significantly, this guideline does not require the patient's attending critical care physician 
to consult with a neurosurgeon or any other type of physician. 
Likewise, the AARC guidelines do not support Dr. Goldenring's conclusion that 
hand bagging would have been a viable alternative method of ventilation. The AARC 
guideline Dr. Goldenring relies on in support of that opinion lists contraindications for a 
transport, including the inability to provide adequate oxygenation during transport either 
by manual ventilation, portable ventilator or standard ICU ventilator. (R. at 3142.) Even 
if applicable, that guideline is a general statement and does not support a conclusion that 
hand bagging Derek would have been a viable alternative in this particular case. 
Even Dr. Goldenring was less than sure about his reliance on the AARC 
guidelines. When asked about the authoritativeness of those guidelines in establishing 
the standard of care, he was quick to state that while he thinks they are relevant, he "will 
rarely say that a guideline on its own absolutely determines even thing because there's 
also case-by-case issues." (R. at 1342.) For all of these reasons. Dr. Goldenring's 
reliance on .AARC guidelines violates Rule 702(b). 
C. Adherence to "Hospital Rules" and Informed Consent 
Dr. Goldenring* s opinions that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by using 
the Pulmonetic ventilator on a critically ill patient and by failing to obtain informed 
consent are based on a faulty conclusion that the CTM process established standards of 
care that govern both the CTM process and a physician's use of ventilators outside that 
process. Dr. Goldenring's opinions do not flow from the facts contained in the record. 
First the record establishes that the Pulmonetic ventilator was used outside the scope of 
CTM process in this case. Thus, facts relating to the CTM process are irrelevant and 
cannot form a reliable basis for standard of care opinions. Second, there is nothing in the 
record to support the conclusion that the CTM process established the standard of care for 
Dr. Witte or otherwise restricted her ability to practice medicine by using a ventilator that 
is both approved by the FDA for use in a PICU setting and used by pediatric critical care 
physicians in other hospitals to transport critically ill patients for a CT scan. 
There is ample support in the record to support the conclusion that the CTM 
process does not establish the standard of care. One. the process is not mandator}7. (R. at 
1982, 2016.) Two, the documented purpose of the process is to create an organized 
system for managing the "equipment life cycle," which is distinguishable from an 
organization whose stated purpose is to set standards of care for health care providers. 
(R. at 3232.) Three, the CTM committee included professionals with no medical training 
or experience such as a clinical engineer and a finance manager. (R. at 3241.) Dr. 
Goldenring ignores these facts and simply concludes that the CTM process established a 
standard of care that should have been followed by Dr. Witte. That conclusion simply 
does not follow from the facts contained in the record. 
Even if the CTM process did have authority to establish standards of care for 
critical care physicians such as Dr. Witte, Dr. Goldenring has drawn inaccurate 
conclusions about the "hospital rules" purportedly established by the CTM committee. 
The record does not reflect that Dr. Goldenring reviewed any CTM committee 
documents, so any opinions he offers about rules purportedly established through the 
CTM process are inherently unreliable. Further, the record does not support Dr. 
Goldenring's conclusion that the CTM committee precluded use of the Pulmonetic 
ventilator on critically ill patients such as Derek. The CTM committee's notes do not 
reflect a decision being made that the ventilator could not be used on critically ill 
patients. (R. at 3171-3174.) Moreover, Dr. Witte "s understanding of the patient 
population to be selected for the clinical evaluations does not support Dr. Goldenring" s 
opinion that the ventilator could not be used on critically ill patients. The fact that the 
CTM committee may have decided to conduct the clinical evaluations using the patient 
population on whom the ventilator wras most likely to be used in Life Flight transports 
does not mean that the ventilator is unsafe for use on all other patient populations, 
including critically ill patients. 
In summary, any decisions made by the CTM committee about how it would 
conduct its business of evaluating ventilators for purchase did not preclude Dr. Witte 
from using whatever FDA approved medical devices were at her disposal to treat Derek. 
Simply put there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the CTM committee had any 
authority to regulate Dr. Witte's practice of medicine or that the committee made any 
attempt to impose restrictions on Dr. Witte's treatment decisions. 
The facts contained in the record also fail to support Dr. Goldenring's conclusion 
that a "hospital rule" required informed consent for use of the Pulmonetic ventilator. 
While the record establishes that the CTM committee discussed the need to have a 
separate discussion with PCMC's risk management department about the need for 
parental consent, the record does not reflect that parental consent was ultimately required. 
To the contrary, the record reflects that two members of the CTM committee, including 
Dr. Witte, did not believe that informed consent was required. (R. at 789. 1910. 3174.) 
Furthermore, the record establishes that the ventilator was used outside the scope of the 
CTM process in this case. Accordingly, any decision made about obtaining informed 
consent for purposes of the CTM process would not apply outside that process. 
Similarly, the PCMC handout titled "Let's Talk About.. . patient and family 
rights" does not support Dr. Goldenring's opinion that informed consent was required for 
use of the ventilator. The handout does not purport to establish a standard of care for 
informed consent and also does not address wrhat specific information must be shared 
with a patient's parents. Rather, the publication generally advises parents that they have 
the right to be informed about their child's diagnosis, treatment and known outcomes and 
that they have the right to participate in their child's plan of care in collaboration with the 
child's physician. (R. at 3146.) The record establishes that all of those things were done 
in this case. Even if the handout established the standard of care for informed consent, it 
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does not require informed consent for use of FDA approved medical devices. 
Accordingly. Dr. Goldenring's reliance on the handout is misplaced and unreliable. 
Finally. Dr. Goldenring's opinion that Derek's father may have had difficulty 
understanding information communicated to him in English is unsupported by the record. 
Even Dr. Goldenring acknowledged as much. (R. at 855. 1322.) In summary. Dr. 
Goldenring's opinions regarding adherence to alleged hospital rules established through 
the CTM process do not follow from the facts. Accordingly, Dr. Goldenring's opinion 
that Dr. Witte breached the standard of care by failing to comply with such rules fails to 
satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements. 
IV. DR. GOLDENRING'S CAUSATION OPINIONS ARE 
SPECULATIVE AND FAIL TO SATISFY RULE 702(B) 
Dr. Goldenring's opinion that use of the Pulmonetic ventilator was the cause of 
Derek's death was properly rejected by the trial court because it is both speculative and 
fails to satisfy the Rule 702(b) requirements. Causation must be affirmatively established 
through non-speculative evidence. Fox v. Brigham Young Univ.* 2007 UT App 406, ^j 
22-23. 176 P.3d 446. An expert whose opinions are speculative should not be allowed to 
testify. Stevenson v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339. 347 (Utah 1996); George v. LDS Hosp.. 
797 P.2d 1117. 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
When questioned about his causation opinion. Dr. Goldenring agreed that it would 
be speculative to say what Derek's outcome would have been absent the ventilator 
failure. (R. at 856.) "Mien specifically asked whether he could give an opinion within a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether Derek would have survived absent 
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the ventilator failure. Dr. Goldenring testified. "He certainly had a chance of survival. 
I'm not sure that I can give you a number. I'm not sure that I have enough mtensive care 
experience to do that." (R. at 856.) 
The University Defendants agree with Dr. Goldenring that any conclusion about 
Derek's outcome absent the ventilator failure is speculative. He was critically ill upon 
admission to PCMC, and his condition deteriorated to the point that Dr. Witte thought he 
could go into cardiopulmonary arrest at any time before the transport at issue occurred. 
Further, Derek's ICPs and CPPs were not conducive to a good neurologic outcome, and 
Dr. Witte was concerned that Derek might die if the CT scan wras not done. Absent the 
ventilator malfunction, Derek's outcome w7as still far from certain. 
Even without Dr. Goldenring's admission that his causation opinion is speculative, 
the opinion was properly stricken because Dr. Goldenring cannot quantify the chance of 
survival he claims Derek lost as a result of ventilator malfunction. While this Court has 
previously held that testimony establishing an increased chance of survival to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainly7 may establish causation, the Court did not address 
the issue of whether the chance of survival must reach a certain threshold. George. 797 
P.2d at 1122; see also Andersen v. Brigham Young Univ.. 879 F. Supp. 1124. 1129 (D. 
Utah 1995). 
It appears that mam" jurisdictions hold that no recovers7 is allowed for loss of 
Chance Recoveiy and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 Tort & 
Ins. L.J. 615. 615-16 (1992). Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery even when the 
patient had less than a fifty percent chance of survival. See Kilpatrick v. Biyant 868 
S.W.2d 594, 600-601 (Term. 1993). 
This Court need not decide which approach should be followed in Utah because 
no matter which approach is chosen, there must be some quantification of the lost chance 
of survival. Courts in other jurisdictions require that the lost chance of survival be 
quantified. In one such case, the court concluded as follows: 
Here, no expert will state with reasonable probability and 
precision what the chances were that the surgery would have 
worked, much less offer any opinion as to the percentage by 
which Defendant's alleged negligence reduced the chance of 
success. The percentages are vital because they form the 
basis for any damage calculation by the jury. Without them, 
the jury would be left to speculation. . . . Thus, regardless of 
the court's willingness to apply the increased risk doctrine . . . 
Plaintiffs proof falls short. 
Kern v. Alfred I. Dupont Inst, of the Nemours Found, 2004 WL 2191036 at *4 (Del. July 
30. 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant) (copy included in 
addendum); see also Foley v. Fletcher. 836 N.E.2d 667.. 677 (111. Ct. App. 2005) 
(overturning jury award because plaintiffs experts could not quantify risk of future injur}7 
as a result of the alleged malpractice): Wright v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr. ofEvansville, Inc.. 
59 F. Supp. 2d 794. 801 n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (citing treatise on damages for proposition 
that value of loss of chance must be "fairly measurable"). 
40 
Quantification of risk has also been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in a 
different context. In a personal injur}7 action, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the fact 
that an expert quantified the plaintiffs risk of future surgery at fifteen percent in holding 
that the increased risk was not speculative and that plaintiff could be awarded damages 
for that increased risk even though it was less than fifty percent. Brown v. Johnson, 24 
Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942, 945 (1970). Regardless of whether Utah's appellate courts 
choose to enforce a minimum threshold requirement for loss of chance, experts still must 
quantify the lost chance so that jurors are not left to sheer speculation in awarding 
damages. Dr. Goldenring's inability to quantify the alleged lost chance of survival in this 
case renders his causation opinion speculative. 
Dr. Goldenring's causation opinion also fails to satisfy the Rule 702(b) 
requirements. The alleged basis for Dr. Goldenring's causation opinion is testimony 
from Dr. Witte. Dr. Witte's testimony does not support Dr. Goldenring's opinion that the 
ventilator failure caused Derek's death. Rather, she testified that while use of the 
ventilator probably influenced the timing of Derek's death, she could not say that the 
ventilator caused his death. (R. at 1892.) Thus. Dr. Goldenring's opinion is based on an 
incorrect interpretation of Dr. Witte's testimony and is therefore unreliable. 
V. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED 
To establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against the Defendants, 
Plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the standard of care; (2) that the 
standard of care was breached; (3) that the Defendants" breach proximate!}" caused injury; 
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and (4) damages. Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2003 UT 51, j^ 96, 82 P.3d 1076. "A 
plaintiffs failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would establish 
any one of the [required elements] of a prima facie case justifies a grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
see also Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (stating that once the 
part}7 moving for summary judgment has challenged the existence of one of the elements 
of the cause of action, the nonmoving part}7 bears the burden of providing some evidence 
in support of the essential elements of his or her claim). 
A plaintiff generally must present expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care, breach of that standard and causation. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 
1980); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270. 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Expert testimony is required to support malpractice claims against health care providers 
because the complex nature of a health care providers sendees is outside the 
understanding and experience of lay persons. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348. 352 (Utah 
1980); Chadwickv. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Preston & 
Chambers,, P.C v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260. 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. informed consent is presumed. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-406 (2008). To rebut that presumption, a plaintiff must show that the 
treatment at issue carried "substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious 
harm" and that the patient was not advised of such risks. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
has concluded that expert testimony is required to support a claim for failure to obtain 
informed consent i;to prove the materiality of the risk involved." ChadwicK 763 P.2d 
817, 821 n.4. 
A. Testimony from Derek's Treating Health Care Providers Does 
Not Establish Plaintiffs Causes of Action 
Plaintiff argues that expert testimony provided by individuals other than Dr. 
Goldenring establishes Plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and failure to obtain 
informed consent. Significantly. Plaintiff fails to cite any testimony from other witnesses 
establishing an essential element of Plaintiff s causes of action, causation. Further, the 
testimony that is cited by Plaintiff on the standard of care is inaccurately summarized. 
Finally, some of the cited testimony fails to establish a duty on the part of the University 
Defendants. 
For example, Plaintiff cites testimony from the CTM committee chairperson. 
Tammy Bleak, R.N., and represents that she acknowledged having a duty to ensure the 
reliability of the Pulmonetic ventilator before allowing it to be used on a patient. A 
review of the record reveals that Plaintiffs summary of Nurse Bleak's testimony is 
inaccurate. Nurse Bleak expressly denied having any quality assurance responsibility for 
new equipment and further testified that new equipment received from the manufacturer 
is considered to be "worthy to be used" on patients after PCMCs clinical engineering 
department performs a basic electrical safety inspection. (R. at 1242.) Even if Nurse 
Bleak's testimony did establish a breach of duty on her part, it does not establish a breach 
of duty by Dr. Witte or impose any liability against her employer, the University. 
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Plaintiff also points to purported testimony from unspecified individuals that 
"hospital rules/' i.e. the CTM process and patient rights handout prohibited use of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator on critically ill patients and also required parental consent. Even if 
the CTM process and patient rights handout wrere relevant and authoritative sources for 
establishing the standard of care for Dr. Witte. the record fails to establish that Dr. Witte 
breached any duty that is purportedly imposed by either the CTM committee or the 
patient rights handout, as argued above. 
B. The Common Knowledge Exception Does Not Apply 
Utah courts have recognized a limited exception to the general rule requiring 
expert testimony to support a medical malpractice case. "[E]xpert testimony is 
unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the 
treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman." 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). This exception is only applicable in 
the most blatant malpractice cases. Nixdorf is a good example of such a case. In Nixdorf, 
the defendant surgeon left a surgical needle inside the plaintiff. Id. at 351. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that expert testimony was unnecessary to establish negligence 
because "it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientific opinion could throw 
little light on the subject." Id. at 352 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff briefly argues that medical knowledge is not necessary to understand this 
case. This argument is without merit. Lay persons have no experience managing 
critically ill pediatric patients and therefore have no basis for knowing whether Derek's 
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medical condition required a CT scan or whether the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only 
viable option for ventilation during the transport. Similarly, lay persons have no 
experience in hospital administration and therefore cannot independently determine 
whether an FDA approved ventilator could be used outside the scope of the CTM process 
or whether any protocols established through the CTM process have any application 
outside that process. Lay persons also do not have the knowledge and experience to 
know what risks were material to the transport and should have been discussed with 
Derek's father. Finally, even if lay persons could understand the standard of care issues 
without the assistance of expert testimony, they have no ability to independently 
determine if the ventilator malfunction caused Derek's death. 
C. Plaintiffs Informed Consent Claim Fails as a Matter of Law 
• Regardless of whether the trial court properly granted the motion to strike Dr. 
Goldenring, summary judgment was properly granted with respect to Plaintiffs claim for 
failure to obtain informed consent. While courts have not addressed the issue of whether 
the status of an in-house equipment purchasing evaluation must be disclosed to patients, 
courts in other jurisdictions have held that the FDA status of a medical device need not be 
disclosed. Patients in several cases brought suit against physicians and alleged that they 
improperly failed to disclose that pedicle screws implanted in the patients* pedicles 
during spinal fusion surgery had not been approved by the FDA for that use. See, e.g.. 
Blazoski v. Coot 787 A.2d 910. 913 (NJ. Sup Ct. App. Div. 2003): Southard v. Temple 
Univ. Hosp.. 781 A.2d 10L 102 (Pa. 2001). 
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The screws at issue in Blazoski and Southard were classified by the FDA as 
"experimental devices of unproven safety and efficacy.55 Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 914. 
While they were approved by the FDA for implantation in the sacrum, they were not 
approved for implantation in pedicles. Id. The courts in those cases recognized that the 
FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. Southard 781 A.2d at 104. The courts 
held, as a matter of law. that physicians are not required to advise patients of the FDA 
status of medical devices. Id. at 108; Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 913. In support of these 
holdings, the courts emphasized that the FDA status of a medical device "does not speak 
directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery.'' Id. at 919. Rather, the 
FDA's classification of pedicle screws as experimental and unproven for safety are 
administrative terms used for regulator}7 purposes and are not risks of the surgical 
procedure itself. Southard, 781 A.2d at 105. 
Here, the Pulmonetic ventilator was approved by the FDA for the very use to 
which it was put by Dr. Witte. The fact that the CTM process for transport ventilators 
w;as incomplete does not speak to the medical risks and benefits of either a transport for a 
CT scan or use of the Pulmonetic ventilator during the transport. Therefore, as a matter 
of law, Dr. Witte had no duty to disclose amthing about the CTM process to Derek's 
father, especially since Dr. Witte* s use of the ventilator w7as outside the scope of the 
CTM process. 
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VI. THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The University joins PCMC's arguments concerning summary judgment in favor 
of the Defendants on Plaintiffs cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and claim for punitive damages. Additionally, the University Defendants 
emphasize that Dr. Witte thought there was a high likelihood that Derek would die if a 
CT scan w7as not completed in the afternoon of November 26. Dr. Witte made a 
medically supported decision to transport Derek to the CT scanner using the Pulmonetic 
ventilator, which was the only available ventilator that could provide the necessary level 
of support. Derek's father was advised that a CT scan was needed and that there was risk 
associated with the transport. In response, he urged the providers to do what they could 
to save his son's life. 
The Pulmonetic ventilator used to transport Derek was approved by the FDA for 
use in transporting PICU patients and has been used by critical care physicians at other 
hospitals for that purpose. Unfortunately, the ventilator lost powrer as a result of a 
mechanical problem that could not have been recognized by Dr. Witte or any of the other 
health care providers. Even without the ventilator failure, Derek's prognosis was very 
uncertain. These are not the kind of extreme and outrageous facts that support a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or a claim for punitive damages. 
Even if the facts in this case did warrant punitive damages, the trial court correctly 
ruled that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah precludes an award of punitive 
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damages against the University Defendants. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-603(l)(a) 
(2008). Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have 
recognized and applied this statutory bar on punitive damages. See Your en v. Tintic Sch. 
Dist, 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, % 66, 5 P.3d 
616, 634. In Lyon, the Utah Supreme Court stated that punitive damages against 
governmental entities are "barred outright." Id. 
In addition to suing the State of Utah, Plaintiffs have brought suit against the 
University of Utah and the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics. All three are 
classified as governmental entities entitled to full protection under the Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(9) (2008) (classifying both universities and hospitals as the State 
of Utah); cf. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, % 21 n.L 53 P.3d 2 (recognizing that the 
University of Utah School of Medicine is a governmental entity* under the Act); Carter v. 
Milford Valley Mem'lHosp., 2000 XJT App21,1j 14. 996 P.2d 1076 (recognizing that the 
Act is implicated when suit is brought against a hospital that is owned and operated by a 
governmental entity). As a matter of law, the University Defendants may not be held 
liable for punitive damages. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted 
in favor of the University Defendants with respect to punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and legal authority;, the trial court's rulings striking 
Dr. Goldenring and granting summary judgment in favor of the University Defendants 
with respect to all of Plaintiff s causes of action and his claim for punitive damages 
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should be affirmed. The Court should exercise its discretion to award costs to the 
University Defendants pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 2-J day of April, 2009. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By_ '^l .lU/^Mi^r^ 
David G. Wffliams 
Bradley R.TBlackham 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees University 
of Utah Hospitals and Clinics, University of 
Utah and State of Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Kern v. Alfred I. Dupont Inst, of the Nemours Found, 2004 WL 2191036 at *4 (Del. July 
30, 2004) 
VVeblldW 
Not Reported in A.2d 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2191036 (Del.Super.) 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2191036 (Del.Super.)) 
c 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Superior Court of Delaware. 
Diane KERN, as next friend of Samantha Kern, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE ALFRED I. DUPONT INSTITUTE OF THE 
NEMOURS FOUNDATION a/k/a A.I. Dupont 
Hospital, Defendant. 
No. Civ.A.02C05001FSS. 
Preliminary Ruling Feb. 26, 2004. 
Submitted April 9, 2004. 
Decided July 30, 2004. 
Upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment-
Granted. 
Kenneth M. Roseman, Ciconte Roseman & Wasser-
man, Wilmington, Delaware, for Plaintiff. 
Joseph S. Naylor, Pepper Hamilton, LLP, Wilming-
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OPINION AND ORDER 
SILVERMAN, J. 
*1 This medical negligence case involves a 
2-month old child who underwent throat surgery to 
widen her trachea. Post-operative complications de-
veloped and the surgery failed. Plaintiff has sued 
the hospital, alleging that nurses negligently mon-
itored an intravenous tube inserted in the child's 
head. 
Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that the surgery was 
dicey. Even so. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's 
post-operative negligence increased the risk that the 
throat surgery would fail. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
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seeks to call the surgeon to testify not only about 
the surgery and other treatment she rendered, but 
also to serve as Plaintiffs medical expert on the 
standard of post-operative care and causation. 
Plaintiff, however, has not retained the treating 
physician, the surgeon, as an expert. If called, the 
treating physician would testify as a fact witness 
about the care she rendered, but she does not agree 
to offer expert opinions about the hospital's treat-
ment. Moreover, if forced to testify as an expert, 
the treating physician would not opine that negli-
gence by Defendant proximately caused injury to 
Plaintiff. 
The court, therefore, must decide two questions: 
First, will the "increased risk doctrine" be expanded 
to cover Plaintiffs claim? Second, can the Plaintiff 
force the child's treating physician to testify as an 
expert on the hospital's standard of care and causa-
tion? The court also will address whether the treat-
ing physician's opinions adequately support 
Plaintiffs cause of action. 
I. 
The parties submitted a pre-trial stipulation includ-
ing the facts below. On September 8, 2000, Sam-
antha Kern was born at Christiana Hospital in Ne-
wark, Delaware. She was eleven weeks premature, 
weighing only two pounds, eight ounces. Samantha 
was unable to breathe on her own, and an endo-
tracheal tube was inserted into her throat to im-
prove airflow to her lungs. 
On November 1, 2000, Samantha transferred from 
Christiana Hospital to the Alfred I. duPont Hospital 
for Children in Wilmington. At the duPont Hospit-
al, Ellen Deutsch, M.D., evaluated Samantha's air-
way and diagnosed her with subglottic stenosis, or a 
narrowing of the airway above the vocal cords. Dr. 
Deutsch works for the hospital as a pediatric 
otolaryngologist. 
Dr. Deutsch performed a cricoid split on Samantha 
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on November 2, 2000 This involved splitting the 
mam cartilage in Samantha's trachea and inserting a 
graft from her hyoid bone in the incision The pro-
cedure was meant to widen Samantha's airway to 
allow unassisted breathing Following the cricoid 
split, Samantha was sedated and paralyzed per Dr 
Deutsch's post-operative instructions 
While Samantha was still sedated and paralyzed on 
November 8, 2000, a nurse discovered that an intra-
venous line in Samantha's scalp had leaked into the 
tissue surrounding the vein m which it was inserted 
Instead of going into the vein, I V fluid was col-
lecting under the skin near the child's head and 
neck, causing swelling The I V was removed, and 
Dr Deutsch placed a dram in an incision she made 
m Samantha's neck during the cncoid split Over 
the next 24 hours, the I V fluid drained and the 
swelling subsided 
*2 On November 9, 10 and 13, 2000, Samantha's 
endotracheal tube was removed to determine 
whether she could breathe autonomously Each 
time, she experienced difficulty breathing and the 
endotracheal tube was replaced On November 13, 
Dr Deutsch performed a tracheotomy on Samantha, 
a procedure where the trachea is cut and a tube is 
inserted into the trachea so that the patient breathes 
directly through the tube Samantha will need the 
help of a tracheotomy tube to breathe for years into 
the future, at the least, and possibly for the rest of 
her life 
Plaintiff argues that Samantha suffered two distinct 
injuries from the I V leak the resulting swelling 
and draining procedure were painful, and the leak 
caused spontaneous movement of Samantha's neck 
The swelling and movement increased the risk to 
an unknown extent, that the cncoid split would fail 
Although Plaintiff has not hired her as an expert, 
Plaintiff contends that Dr Deutsch, as treating 
physician, is available and the perfect witness to 
opine about Defendant's alleged negligence 
Defendant counters that Plaintiffs proof fails in 
se\eral ways Dr Deutsch, who is employed by De-
fendant, cannot be compelled to offer opinions 
against her will Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to 
identify an expert to establish Defendant's negli-
gence Delaware's medical negligence statute, as 
presented below, requires medical expert testimony 
on standard of care and causation In addition, were 
she to testify, Dr Deutsch would not adequately 
support Plaintiffs "increased risk" claim While she 
would allow that any negligence by Defendant 
could have increased the risk that the surgery would 
fail, Dr Deutsch would not hazard a guess as to the 
specific percent by which the risk of failure was in-
creased, much less that any negligence probably 
caused the failure 
II 
Procedurally, on May 1, 2002, Plaintiff filed a com-
plaint for alleged injuries to her daughter Defend-
ant answered on June 3, 2002 Defendant moved for 
summary judgment on November 26, 2003, and or-
al argument was held on February 5, 2004 The 
court announced this decision, without elaboration, 
at the pre-trial conference on February 26, 2004 
Plaintiff conceded that in light of the court's de-
cision, Plaintiff had no medical expert Further-
more, she declined to attempt to find one Accord-
ingly, it is undisputed that the court's and Plaintiffs 
decisions mean that this case is over This opinion 
explains and finalizes the court's informal, February 
26, 2004 ruling 
III 
Summary judgment is proper where there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, thus entitling the 
FN1 
moving party to judgment as a matter of law x A 
court deciding a summary judgment motion must 
identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is 
necessary to decide the case but not to decide the 
issues As mentioned for present purposes the 
facts are not m dispute The court, therefore, must 
apply the undisputed facts to the law, as the court 
finds the law to be, and m that way decide the mo-
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tion. 
FN1. Johnson v. Bowman, 1997 WL 
719354, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Mer-
rill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 
96, 99-100 (Del. 1992)). 
FN2. Merrill, 606A.2dat99. 
IV. 
Cumberbatch, actually a "lost chance" case, it was 
given that absent defendant's malpractice, the pa-
tient had a forty-five percent chance of surviving. 
But the malpractice had reduced the patient's 
chances to twenty-five percent. Cumberbatch rejec-
ted the "lost chance" claim, but only because the 
claim in Cumberbatch was for wrongful death. In 
dicta, Cumberbatch suggested that Delaware would 
adopt the then-emerging, "proportional approach" 
to compensation for loss of chance. 
A. Increased Risk Doctrine 
*3 As mentioned, there are two issues here. First, 
Plaintiff argues the "increased risk doctrine." Es-
sentially, Plaintiffs stance is: 
The I.V. infiltrate caused swelling and spontaneous 
movement of Samantha's neck. The swelling and 
spontaneous movement caused an increased risk 
that the cricoid split [would] fail and that Sam-
antha was at an increased risk of further injury 
A A FN3 
and damages. 
FN3. Plaintiffs Answering Brief, at 4. 
Plaintiff further says: 
[T]he sworn testimony and the statement of Dr. 
Deutsch could lead to a conclusion that the swell-
ing and neck movement caused by the I.V. infilt-
rate increased the risk that the cricoid split per-
FN4 formed on Samantha would fail. 
FN4.Id., at 5. 
Ten years ago, while answering certified questions 
in United States v. Cumberbatch, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware introduced the "increased risk 
doctrine" to Delaware, in a footnote. Cumberbatch 
explains that "[t]he increased risk doctrine provides 
that a person may recover damages if the person's 
risk of suffering a negative medical condition is in-
creased because of medical malpractice. „FN6 In 
FN5. 647 A.2d 1098 (Del. 1994). 
FN6./J. at 1100 n. 3. 
A year after Cumberbatch, the other shoe fell. In 
another case presenting certified questions, United 
States v. Anderson, Delaware's Supreme Court 
formally adopted the "increased risk of future 
harm" doctrine. Anderson involved a late diagnosed 
cancer. There, the patient's chance of avoiding re-
currence of cancer dropped from 100 percent to 85 
percent, due to the negligence. Anderson holds that 
the increased risk doctrine is recognized in 
Delaware, mentioning that "[t]he increased risk 
doctrine has been employed in cases involving late 
diagnoses which allowed cancer to spread ... [t]he 
doctrine has also been employed in cases involving 
skull fractures and resulting future susceptibility to 
meningitis." Plaintiff relies entirely on Ander-
son. 
FN7. 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995). 
FN8. Id. at 76 (citations omitted). 
Cumberbatch and Anderson cite with approval the 
federal District Court for Delaware's Cudone v. 
FN9 Gehret, which also involved a late diagnosed 
cancer. There, the medical negligence caused the 
plaintiff-patient's chance of recurrence to increase 
from 25-30% to 50-60%. Cudone held the increased 
risk doctrine applied. Cudone, however, also re-
ferred to dicta in Shively v. Klein, which in-
volved a loss of chance. Shively warned against us-
ing the loss of chance doctrine for other than its in-
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tended purpose. Cudone, referring to Shively, ex-
plained: 
FN9. 821 F.Supp. 266 (D.Del.1993). 
FN10. 551 A.2d41 (Del.1988). 
[T]he Court determined that the application of the 
concept sought by plaintiffs, i.e., one which re-
laxed the standard of causation, "would have 
been a drastic departure from the causation stand-
FN11 
ards consistently applied in Delaware." 
FN11. 821 F.Supp. at 269 (quoting Shively, 
551 A.2dat44). 
*4 Other authorities also apply the increased risk 
FN12 doctrine. One example is Petriello v. 
FN13 Kalman, a Connecticut case cited with ap-
proval in Anderson. The patient, Ann Petriello, ex-
perienced a difficult pregnancy. A doctor, Roy E. 
Kalman, negligently perforated Petriello's uterus 
while performing a dilatation and curettage on her. 
A different doctor then had to resect Petriello's 
bowel in order to repair the damage. But because of 
resulting adhesions "there was between an 8 and 16 
percent chance that [Petriello] would suffer a future 
bowel obstruction as a result of the bowel resection 
FN14 
necessitated by [Dr. Kalman's] actions ." The 
increased risk doctrine led to a damages award that 
was sustained on appeal. 
FN 12. See generally Edwards v. Family 
Practice Associates, Incorporated, 798 
A.2d 1059 (Del. Super.Ct.2002) (although 
called "loss of chance," increased risk doc-
trine applied where failure to diagnose 
stomach cancer hastened plaintiffs death); 
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts In-
volving Preexisting Conditions and Future 
Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353 (1981). 
FN13. 576 A.2d 474 (Conn.1990). 
Regardless of whether the increased risk or lost 
chance doctrines were applied or not, a common 
element of the cases presented above is that every 
plaintiff proffered expert opinion specifically quan-
tifying the increased risk or loss of chance caused 
by the medical negligence. Here, no expert will 
state with reasonable probability and precision what 
the chances were that the surgery would have 
worked, much less offer any opinion as to the per-
centage by which Defendant's alleged negligence 
reduced the chance of success. The percentages are 
vital because they form the basis for any damages 
calculation by the jury. Without them, the jury 
would be left to speculation. Furthermore, it is un-
clear whether Plaintiffs current condition, using a 
tracheotomy tube, is permanent. Thus, regardless of 
the court's willingness to apply the increased risk 
doctrine and force the treating physician to testify, 
Plaintiffs proof falls short. 
In passing, the court reiterates the concern in 
Shively about the relaxed, proportional causation 
standard's impact on Delaware's entrenched ap-
proach to proximate cause. Unlike Connecticut, 
Delaware is a so-called "but for" jurisdiction. Typ-
ically, if a defendant's negligence merely is a sub-
stantial factor in causing injury, a plaintiff cannot 
recover in Delaware. The increased risk doctrine 
seems to compromise that standard where a treat-
ment's chance of success was less than fifty percent 
at the outset. In such a situation, can it be said that 
any negligence which further reduced plaintiffs 
chances was more than a substantial factor in caus-
ing injury? In other words, if a defendant's negli-
gence indisputably increased the likelihood of fail-
ure, but the surgery probably was doomed anyway, 
can it be said that but for the negligence the surgery 
probably would have succeeded? Those are ques-
tions for another case because, as presented above, 
no one can quantify the harm, if any, caused by De-
fendant's alleged negligence here. 
B. Expert Witness 
FN14.M At 481. Delaware law requires expert medical testimony in 
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medical negligence cases such as this one. In-
stead of retaining an expert, Plaintiff merely would 
call Samantha's surgeon as her expert on the hospit-
al's standard of care and causation. Plaintiff would 
question the treating physician about the throat sur-
gery she performed and try to elicit the opinion that 
the I.V.'s placement violated the standard of care 
and caused the surgery to fail, which made the 
tracheotomy necessary. 
FN15.DEL.CODE ANN.tit. 18, § 6853 
(1999)("No liability shall be based upon 
asserted negligence unless expert medical 
testimony is presented as to the alleged de-
viation from the applicable standard of 
care in the specific circumstances of the 
case and as to the causation of the alleged 
personal injury or death ..."). 
*5 The first problem is that the treating physician 
has little or no factual knowledge about Samantha's 
post-operative care. More importantly, the treating 
physician is employed by Defendant. She has not 
been offered as an expert for Defendant. Nor has 
she performed an "independent medical examina-
tion" at either party's request. 
FN16. Cf. Pinkett v. Brittingham, 567 A.2d 
858 (Del. 1989) (rule preventing one party 
from compelling opposing party's employ-
ee from testifying inapplicable to doctor 
who performs independent medical exam-
ination and testifies strictly from own re-
port). 
In Delaware, a witness generally cannot be forced 
to offer expert opinions. Nor can defendant's em-
ployee be compelled to testify as plaintiffs expert 
witness. This prevents a form of involuntary 
servitude, with employees and experts being 
made to "serve without remuneration and without 
FN19 [their] consent." It is no answer here, as 
Plaintiff argues, that the treating physician gave a 
deposition on which Plaintiff is willing to rely. The 
physician appeared as a fact witness. When 
Plaintiff asked the physician for her expert opinion, 
that drew an objection and the answer was given 
over the objection. 
¥i$\lMontecinos v. Dickinson Medical 
Group, PA., Del.Super., C.A. No. 
94C-07-027, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 21, 
1996)(ORDER); Home v. Kent General 
Hospital, Incorporated, Del.Super., C.A. 
No. 85C-AP-29, Bifferato, J. (Aug. 28, 
1990). 
FN18. See State v. McLaughlin, 514 A.2d 
1139, 1142 (Del.Super.Ct.1986) (citations 
omitted). 
FN19.Montecinos at *1. 
Moreover, as mentioned, when the physician 
offered an opinion about standard of care, it was 
not helpful to Plaintiff. Most significantly, the 
physician attributed the surgery's failure to the ex-
tensiveness of Plaintiffs congenital problem. And 
the physician did not see the swelling or Plaintiffs 
movement, whether caused by negligence or not, as 
even a significant factor in the surgery's outcome. 
At most, the treating physician testified in depos-
ition that along with several other possibilities, 
"motion of the neck ... can detract from the success 
of the surgery."As to the possibility of excessive 
motion and its effect on the surgery in this case, the 
physician testified: 
Q: Is there any physical finding that you can rely 
upon to support a conclusion that excessive mo-
tion did not cause the failure of the surgery? 
A: No. 
Q: If you assume that subsequent to the massive ed-
ema there was motion, could that motion have af-
fected the success of the surgery? And if not, why 
not? 
A: It depends on how much motion. And I cannot 
say that didn't have an effect. 
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Referring to this case's facts rather than theoretical 
possibilities however, the treating physician further 
testified "There's nothing m the notes about ex-
cessive motion, and I don't recall whether there was 
excessive motion "And, as mentioned above, the 
treating physician attributed the surgery's failure to 
Plaintiffs congenital condition, not Defendant's 
treatment 
As to the swelling caused by the I V infiltrate, the 
physician allowed that "if [Plaintiff] had significant 
swelling, that could cause airway obstruction with 
failure of the cncoid split and an inability to 
breathe adequately and comfortably after extuba-
tion "Along the same line, giving Plaintiff the bene-
fit of several inferences, the treating physician testi-
fied the swelling had an impact on the timing of 
Plaintiffs extubation And the physician further 
testified that following the physician's schedule for 
extubation "decreases the complications, which are 
often pulmonary, and increases the chance of suc-
cess " 
*6 Plaintiffs complications, of course, were not 
pulmonary Moreover, the physician did not opine 
that any change in the extubation schedule had a 
bearing on the surgery m this case, much less that it 
increased the risk of failure here She also testified, 
"I don't think anybody knows the precise duration 
of intubation that's optimal There are sometimes 
circumstances about an individual patient that 
would encourage delay of the extubation "Again, 
the physician made no effort to tie the theory to this 
case's facts The only reasonable way to read the 
treating physician's explanation for what happened 
in this case is that the surgery failed because it 
failed 
Finally, as to the expert testimony issue, the court 
appreciates that there is a scintilla of evidence that 
the child expenenced pam due to the swelling and 
the minor surgery she underwent to correct it Nev-
ertheless Plaintiffs proof establishes neither liabil-
ity nor causation All of the above assumes that the 
physician can be forced to testify m the first place, 
which the court cannot do As it stands, Plaintiff 
has no medical expert witness and, as mentioned, 
she declines to find one 
V 
For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Plaintiff 
can present no medical expert testimony as to the 
deviation from the applicable standard of care by 
Defendant and as to causation of any injury to 
Plaintiff Thus, Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is GRANTED 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
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